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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

Peking, the Army, and the Provincial Authorities

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
25 April 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Peking, the Army, and the Provincial AuthoritiesSummary

The origins of the Cultural Revolution in China are obscure, and the kind of information available concerning the disorderly course it has followed permits a variety of interpretations. It seems likely that the trouble which has kept China in turmoil for more than a year and which brought the country to the verge of anarchy in January 1967 had its roots in differences over policy in the fall of 1965. Mao's plans for rekindling revolutionary enthusiasm among the people and "steeling" the next generation to ensure that China would not backslide into revisionism were probably an important issue--probably the major question taken up at a top-level meeting in Peking during September and October 1965.

Conflicts generated by this basic issue probably became entwined with a struggle inside the party leadership during the winter of 1965-66. There is some reason to believe that Mao became seriously ill after he dropped out of sight in November, and this would almost certainly have triggered preparatory maneuvering to claim his mantle among the

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finely balanced forces at the top of the hierarchy in Peking. When Mao returned to take up an active role again in early spring this led to the destruction of several major party leaders who had opposed Mao and whose ambitions and conniving had been exposed. The purge--the first to affect politburo figures in seven years--deepened Mao's suspicions of all the rest and thus helped set the stage for the 11th central committee plenum in early August 1966. The evidence indicates that this plenum was the scene of a showdown between Mao and the old-line party apparatus responsive to Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. Mao, supported by Lin Piao and Premier Chou En-lai, won a victory in Peking. It was not conclusive, however, because the new team of top leaders--a basically unstable group--faced growing resistance from powerful leaders in the provinces. Most of these men had been clients of Liu and Teng and could read the writing on the wall.

A drive to bring some of these provincial party leaders down began at once, but was not pressed strongly until December. By then the opposition included virtually every first secretary in the regional party bureaus and provinces and about half the commanders of the 13 military regions. They were aligned with a number of key party and military figures still able to function in Peking and thus made a potentially formidable group. They struggled desperately to retain their positions and succeeded in this until the military establishment entered the conflict on the side of Peking during the last week in January.

The basis on which leaders at the center gained positive support from the armed forces is not clear. It seems likely that a number of high-ranking military officers opposed Mao and Lin Piao on this issue in December--former Marshal Ho Lung and 19 other major military figures were later charged with having plotted a "coup" and were purged shortly after the turn of the year.

There is reason to believe that up to mid-January a number of key field commanders were still uncommitted, some because they were confused by the

situation in Peking and others because they had reservations about the course of the Cultural Revolution. The military swung solidly into line in late January and early February, however, at a time when the Cultural Revolution was being moderated. A firm causal connection cannot be established on the basis of the evidence available, but the sequence of events suggests that the views of military leaders were probably a factor--perhaps a major one--in Peking's decision to put a damper on "rebel" activity.

It seems likely that the military establishment is an essentially conservative political organism, and as such would opt for stability and unity. There is no way of knowing whether a significant number of commanders would have defied Peking if the Cultural Revolution had not been moderated toward the end of January. Doubts on this score almost certainly existed at the center, however, and would have provided powerful support for arguments in favor of a change in tactics.

When it appeared that the restoration of order had been given priority by Peking and moves were made to reassure the military concerning the conduct of the Cultural Revolution within the armed forces, the army moved into action decisively. This is a reflection of the extent to which China has become a modern state, with an army motivated by nationalistic patriotism.

Despite indications that some military leaders were uncertain about whom to support in Peking, and that a few may for a time have backed efforts by regional political authorities to maintain their positions, there has been no evidence of wavering loyalty to the state within the officer corps at large or among the rank and file, or of any widespread disposition to support a movement toward secession.

Once the military took an active role, resistance in the provinces collapsed and there were indications in February that the brakes had been applied to the Cultural Revolution. In early March,

however, there was a resurgence of "rebel" revolutionary attacks on government and party officials. These apparently were ordered by Mao to reverse the trend toward phasing out the more violent and disorderly aspects of the Cultural Revolution. A new campaign launched against Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping at the end of March apparently was intended to prepare for their formal removal.

The outcome of these latest developments cannot be predicted, beyond a general forecast of continued confusion with new "twists and turns" in the months ahead as the current leaders work to construct new administrative machinery from the wreckage of the old party and government apparatus. The course of the struggle during the December-January crisis, and the final victory of the center over power constellations on the periphery suggest, however, that over the longer run the prospect is for a unified China governed on strongly nationalistic principles.

Peking Presses Regional and Provincial Party Members

1. Attacks on powerful figures in the regional and provincial party apparatus began soon after the central committee plenum in August 1966 and the subsequent creation of the Red Guards as a mass action political weapon responsive to forces supporting Mao and Lin Piao. Red Guard activist teams fanned out all over China during September and October to spread the Cultural Revolution and "bombard the headquarters" of local authorities in a disorderly campaign of riotous demonstrations and mob violence.

2. [redacted] regional party bureaus and more than a dozen provincial party committees were brought under varying degrees of pressure. The political and governmental apparatus outside the capital resisted with a variety of devices, pretending in some instances to welcome Red Guard teams and offering sham cooperation but in fact attempting to block their efforts. Local "guards" were often organized and pitted against the interlopers from Peking. Security forces were used by local authorities to channel Red Guard violence and where necessary to suppress hoodlum gangs attacking local leadership organs.

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3. The pressure was stepped up by Peking during November. Red Guard organization was improved and the assault by them on the provincial apparatus was more carefully focused. Up to the beginning of December, however, the only major provincial leaders dismissed were the first secretary of the Hopei provincial committee-- who had been in trouble prior to August--and the second secretaries in Shensi and Heilungkiang provinces. In Peking, Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping continued to show up with Mao at Red Guard rallies, although they were by then shorn of significant political power.

4. In December the attack from the center went into high gear. Former party leaders such as Peng Chen, already brought down, were "dragged out" by Red Guards and physically abused. A full-scale campaign, backed by Madame Mao and other leaders, was launched against Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. The charges brought against Liu and Teng were tantamount to treason, and it appeared that preparations were being made for formal proceedings against them. The new attacks, in fact,

amounted to a threatened declaration of war against power holders on the periphery. The option of a settlement between Peking and regional satraps was still open, though by no means an inviting one since the terms offered by the center were close to unconditional surrender.

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The Opposition

7. The men threatened by this drive to finish off resistance in the provinces belonged to cohesive local groups loosely connected with each other and sharing a common interest in political survival. Most officials under attack owed their positions to Liu Shao-chi and party general secretary Teng Hsiao-ping, who had been demoted at the 11th party plenum in August. For years Liu and Teng had been building the party apparatus, both in Peking and the provinces, and their fall from grace jeopardized the positions of large numbers of key officials.

8. Apart from this, the generally united front presented by regional and provincial officials against efforts to bring them down was a reflection of loyalties developed among men working together in outlying

areas. Day-to-day operation of governmental and party machinery in regional organizations led, almost inevitably, to the growth of self-serving "establishments" made up of officials accustomed to dealing with one another and taken up with local problems.

9. It seems likely, moreover, that over the years many of these men have become progressively alienated from authorities at the center who have been the source of relentless pressure to achieve results and who repeatedly made local officials the scapegoats for blunders committed in Peking. The considerable degree of popular support commanded by these men stems mainly from the regional diversity and provincialism based on geographic, economic, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural differences which still exist.

The Provinces Fight Back

10. Local authorities outside the capital responded to Peking's offensive with a counterblow using political weapons denounced by central authorities under the blanket term "economism." This was an appeal to parochial self-interest designed to produce paralyzing confusion and at the same time to enlist support from the people by offering them improvement in their lot. Peking had in fact issued instructions which authorized some of the actions taken by provincial authorities. Later, however, the center charged that local authorities were "bribing" the workers with wage increases and a share-out of public property, encouraging them to strike and go to the capital in order to present grievances. Other devices used by local authorities included deception tactics--setting up false "rebel" groups and staging sham "take-overs"--and a kind of political judo which involved overcompliance with orders from the center such as the demand that workers be placed in charge. Management technicians followed this instruction by leaving their jobs and thus crippling operations in key installations or shutting them down entirely.

11. All this added up to a kind of passive resistance which produced disorder verging on chaos in many parts of China. Peking's propaganda asserted that a "revisionist" conspiracy to seize power lay at

the bottom of these troubles. There is, however, no evidence that opposition forces were ever anything more than a loose coalition, or that leaders at the regional or provincial level were playing for anything more than a stalemate which would enable them to retain their positions. Most of the provincial and regional power holders were able to hold out until after the middle of January, a situation which would not have existed if the armed forces had been committed on the side of central authority. It seems equally clear that, if the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) had been firmly backing provincial and regional authorities, unarmed bands of troublemakers from other parts of China would never have been able to humiliate local officials and disrupt the operation of the party and government apparatus.

The Armed Forces on the Sidelines

12. Peking's directive publicized on 23 January ordering the PLA actively to support Maoist revolutionaries implies that the army had until then been under instructions to stand clear of the struggle. Peking's failure to use the armed forces against resistance in the provinces during the August-December period might have resulted from a decision by Mao and Lin Piao that the situation was not serious enough to warrant such drastic action, or that it was not yet time to bring the Cultural Revolution to a victorious conclusion. During the early part of the period this explanation is a plausible hypothesis but after the middle of December it is unconvincing. The situation outside the capital became steadily worse toward the end of the month, and by the turn of the year it had become the most serious internal security crisis faced by the regime since it took power in 1949. It is hard to believe that Mao and Lin would have permitted the massive disorder to drag on in East China as it did from late December to the middle of January--in particular the cutting of the important Shanghai-Peking rail line--if they had been certain of the PLA.

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15. Attacks on important military figures by the Maoists which began in early January suggest that the armed forces were not used because some key military leaders had opposed plans to achieve final victory for Mao's radical program by using military means to overthrow political leaders in outlying areas with whom they had connections. They may have confronted Mao with demands that he should relieve the crisis by moderating the course of the revolution and coming to terms with his opponents. The timing of events is obscure, but if such a showdown took place it seems most likely to have occurred shortly before the end of the year.

The "Plot" of Ho Lung

16. Heavy criticism of military leaders began in earnest when Liu Chih-chien came under fire on 8 January. A deputy director of the PLA General Political Department since 1958, Liu had headed the army's Cultural Revolution Group charged with purging the armed forces during late 1966. The group was reorganized on 11 January and Madame Mao was named as its "adviser."



17. An editorial in the Liberation Army Journal on 12 January declared that the new body would open "ferocious fire" on the "handful" in power within the armed forces who had taken the "capitalist road." The Army journal reaffirmed the assertion made in People's Daily and Red Flag on 11 January that the Cultural Revolution had been "pushed" to a new stage by recent events and reminded readers that the army is the "mainstay of the proletarian dictatorship"--i.e., the chief instrument of domestic control. According to poster reports, Lin Piao made a speech before the Cultural Revolution Group a few days earlier in which he declared that the country was in a "state of civil war."

18. The scope and nature of the opposition in the military leadership is suggested by charges surfaced several days after the reorganization of the army purge machinery. Posters put up on 15 January charged that important party and military leaders had been involved in a coup plot hatched by Ho Lung in February 1966. Ho, a marshal until ranks were abolished in 1965 and a member of the military affairs committee of the central committee, was said to have headed a group which included "many" military leaders from the general staff, the air force, navy, and the Peking and Chengtu Military regions; 19 were eventually identified by name.

19. The charge that plotting of some kind had been going on among the military is credible, and involvement of officers in the Chengtu Military Region--the stronghold of Southwest Bureau chief Li Ching-chuan--and the key Peking Military Region makes sense. It seems unlikely, however, that the details of the accusation, particularly the date adduced, are accurate. The charges should probably best be viewed as symbolic ones, revealing opposition but masking its true nature. It would thus appear that the crimes were not actually plotting a "palace coup," and that the indictment may have been backdated--perhaps in order to conceal the fact that Maoist forces were currently facing strong opposition within the military leadership over the issue of using the armed forces as Mao's iron fist to win quick political victory in the provinces.

20. The fall of Tao Chu, denounced in poster attacks shortly after his last appearance on 29 December, is another reflection of the depth of the struggle that was under way in December. Until around the middle

of the month Tao had appeared firmly established as number four man in the post-August hierarchy.

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[Redacted] Posters appearing in late November charged Tao with protecting several party bosses in the provinces, including Li Pao-hua--third secretary in the East China Bureau and party chief in Anhwei Province. Tao would thus have had an interest in blocking a drive to eliminate power centers outside Peking. His sudden and unexpected denunciation at the end of December may indicate that he joined the military and party opposition in desperation when the issue came to a head.

The Army Reacts to the Purge

21. It was clear that bringing down Ho Lung and his fellow conspirators did not mark the end of the matter so far as the military establishment was concerned. Even the newly reorganized armed forces' purge machinery was not regarded as reliable by its creators. Within a few days after the reorganization, two members--both editors of Liberation Army Journal--had been removed. Instead of stimulating new enthusiasm for the "revolution," the move to strengthen the military purge apparatus, together with attacks on major military figures, may actually have operated to heighten fears regarding their future position among senior troop commanders--generals of armies and high-ranking staff officers in the military regions--and inclined them to hang back.

22. Many of these men had former ties of one sort or another with military leaders who had come under attack, and even those with no connections which then appeared to be potentially dangerous must have been fearful of what a further enlargement of the "revolution" might bring in the way of ex post facto charges later on. Up to mid-January local political leaders had been successfully resisting in virtually every province, and commanders in almost every military region must have

[Redacted]

foreseen the possibility that they might be held responsible for this following a Maoist triumph even if they had been acting all along on the basis of orders from their superiors.

23. Apprehensions of this sort could be expected to reinforce the fundamental lack of sympathy for the Cultural Revolution which was probably widespread among officers of field grade or higher. We have no firm evidence on which to base an assessment of the state of mind...within the officer corps of the PLA, but military establishments tend to be conservative and it seems reasonable to suppose that by this time the professional soldiers who formed its backbone had seen more than enough revolutionary disorder and would be receptive to proposals which would bring it to a halt.

The PLA Faces a Choice

24. The problem probably came to a head for the military around the third week in January. A directive was issued on 23 January ordering the army to take an active role in backing pro-Mao forces. The earlier practice of "standing on the sidelines" in the struggle was condemned and all orders to this effect were countermanded. A major editorial printed in People's Daily the day before puts this directive into perspective. It admitted that Mao had recently suffered a "serious setback" and spoke gloomily of the possibility of increasing violence and "zigzags and ups and downs" before victory could be achieved. The tone was violent, almost hysterical, and the prescription given for Maoist success was to "seize power! power!! and more power!!!". The editorial asserted flatly that "he who is without power is nothing. Of all the important things, the possession of power is the most important!"

25. Assertions that troops were being used in force to subdue Mao's opponents in the provinces appeared in Peking broadcasts immediately following issuance of the new directive. Claims of successful take-overs by Maoists, however, indicated that in fact widespread resistance was continuing and that the armed forces did not move as one man to follow the new instructions. In some areas the response was prompt, but in others resistance and confusion persisted for

weeks, suggesting that the military--who held the key to the situation--were dragging their feet.

26. Liu Lan-tao, party boss in the Northwest Region where resistance had been very strong, was reported to have been "dragged out" by Red Guards in Sian about 23 January along with 17 of his chief lieutenants. A photograph of this event was posted in Peking on 8 February. Li Ching-chuan, first secretary of the Southwest Bureau--another hotbed of resistance--was paraded in disgrace through the streets of Chengtu about the same time.

27. Trouble continued to be reported in many parts of China during early February, however, especially in Tibet and Szechwan where Red Guards complained--as they had been doing for months--that they were being suppressed by military units.

28. These differences cannot be satisfactorily explained on the ground that the armed forces lacked the strength to impose the will of the center on provincial leaders immediately, or that the military did not have clear instructions. It appears, therefore, that the spotty performance of the military reflected unwillingness on the part of key commanders in some areas to carry out orders. Under normal circumstances the response to such a situation would be immediate removal and court martial of the insubordinate commanders--sending in troops from other areas to accomplish this if necessary.


29. Peking appears instead to have changed the orders, moderating the Cultural Revolution so that it would be acceptable to the armed forces--providing assurances which would win the active support of the military. Specific arrangements may have been made with a number of individual commanders in Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Sinkiang--similar to the bargains struck with the warlords in the 1930s--but the over-all appeal for army backing looked more like an effort to reach political consensus.

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An editorial in Liberation Army Journal broadcast by Peking on 25 January emphasized the point that in assisting the "rebel revolutionaries" the army should rely on political persuasion rather than force.

33. A new directive to the armed forces issued on 27 January provided justification for a slowdown in the pace of the Cultural Revolution. According to posters observed in Peking, Mao on that day had ordered all military regions to be alert against the "forces of imperialism and revisionism," specifically mentioning Sinkiang and the military regions on China's Pacific coast. Mao was quoted as saying that in view of the current military situation the "timetable for the Cultural Revolution may be set back somewhat." The directive was issued under the name of Yeh Chien-ying for the Military Affairs

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Committee--the body of which Lin Piao had been "in charge" since 1960.

34. Another directive was issued by the Military Affairs Committee on 28 January concerning the conduct of the Cultural Revolution within the armed forces. Orders were reportedly issued that soldiers, "especially commanders," were not to be arrested or physically harmed, although they might be "ridiculed." Attacks against individuals were to be permitted but it was forbidden to "criticize the command" itself. The implied guarantee of immunity to most senior officers may reflect a successful attempt to reassure PLA leaders, which brought the weight of the armed forces behind the authorities in Peking.

The Army Gets in Line

35. With the armed forces no longer on the sidelines, provincial resistance began to collapse during the last week in January. On 27 January a radio-broadcast from the capital of Anhwei Province announced the dismissal of provincial first secretary Li Pao-hua and four other local party and government figures. Li was also third secretary of the headless East China Bureau and was probably a client of Tao Chu.

36. A new type of government organization began to appear in the provinces based on a three-way alliance between military, party, and "revolutionary" elements. The first of these alliances appeared in Heilungkiang around 1 February, a second in Fukien on 11 February, and a third was announced in Kweichow on 14 February. Propaganda broadcasts concerning all of these new organizations stressed the key role of the armed forces in setting them up. A representative of the PLA was the featured speaker in the inaugural rally in Heilungkiang. In Fukien, Han Hsien-chu, the ranking professional military figure in the Foochow Military Region, and Wei Chin-shui, who is governor and a party secretary, were the principal speakers. Military men and "revolutionary leading cadres"--the term Peking began to use to describe acceptable party leaders in the provinces--took the leading roles, with "revolutionary elements" taking a subordinate position.

37. Orders were apparently issued about this time aimed at curbing military participation in Cultural Revolution agitation. Authoritative posters seen on 8 February reported a directive by Lin Piao that soldiers who had been engaged in "exchanging revolutionary experiences" were all to return to their posts by 20 February. Lin declared that all "liaison offices" co-ordinating local revolutionary rebel activity would soon be abolished.

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39. A wall newspaper

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described efforts to restore order in Inner Mongolia. The Military Affairs Committee and the State Council reportedly issued a joint directive on 6 February ordering party, army, and "rebel" units in the region to stop fighting. The poster stated that a plane had been dispatched to the capital city of Inner Mongolia to bring representatives of the three groups to Peking to settle the conflict.

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40. The behavior of military units and the role they played appear to have differed in some particulars from place to place. The over-all pattern, however, indicates that the armed forces displayed great internal cohesion and took a conservative position--in opposition alike to the "rebel" revolutionaries and troublemaking local authorities. The PLA appears generally to have held back until the movement to slow down and to moderate the Cultural Revolution began to gain strength.

An Olive Branch to the Party Establishment

41. Moves to bring the armed forces into the struggle were accompanied by a parallel shift in Peking's approach to the party apparatus, signaled by a Red Flag editorial broadcast on 30 January which referred to experienced cadres as the "treasure of the party" and warned against indiscriminate attacks on them. This was not a new line in that bad elements in the party had from the outset been called a "handful," but the emphasis was markedly different from that in pronouncements during December and early January.

42. The shift was also reflected in a wall newspaper observed some time later which reported that Chou En-lai had met with representatives of 23 "revolutionary" factions on 1 February and had urged a return to the policy of correcting erring party officials in a way which would not destroy their future usefulness. Chou reportedly warned that mistreatment of party cadres, particularly those at the basic level, might alienate "revolutionary forces" from the people. A broadcast from Lhasa on 9 February quoted the Red Flag editorial publicized by Peking on 31 January urging true "revolutionaries" to trust and use party leaders, even those who had committed errors, so long as they were not "antiparty." Those who indiscriminately labeled party leaders as "persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road" were denounced.

43. A broadcast from the provincial capital of Inner Mongolia on 10 February denounced ultraleftists, who it said were "enthusiastic about internal war and advocate aimless fighting." A similar line was taken by a broadcast from Heilungkiang four days later

which criticized a "very small handful" of such people in the "revolutionary ranks" who refused to cooperate with the old-line party leaders retained in the new revolutionary committee which had been formed for the province on 31 January. The broadcast stated flatly that these dissidents were "counterrevolutionaries."

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45. Provincial broadcasts soon began to reflect this new approach to the party machine at the local level. On 15 February the radio in Tsingtao, a port city in Shantung Province seized by Maoist "rebels" on 29 January, lashed out at those who had charged that "all leading cadres are guilty of suppressing the revolution." The same day the Harbin station in Heilungkiang demanded that leading cadres "must be given an opportunity to repent" and enumerated broad categories of cadres who were redeemable.

New Impetus to "Tripartite Alliances"

46. Editorials in People's Daily on 17 February and in Liberation Army Journal on the 18th underscored earlier announcements praising the policy of forming a "tripartite alliance" among old-line party officials, the army, and "revolutionary" organizations and claimed that this had already been achieved in four provinces and two municipalities. This concept apparently supplanted the notion of establishing new revolutionary "communes" as governing bodies. Until early February an organization supposedly based on the Paris Commune of 1871 was being touted as a model, and the formation of "communes" was announced with great fanfare in a number of cities. On 19 February, however, the party central committee ordered that no city or province would use the name "commune" in its title and that those which had established them

should promptly establish new "revolutionary committees."

47. About the same time, according to posters, several leaders in Peking questioned whether the Paris Commune provided a useful guide for China. Some months earlier the commune had been extolled in speeches and articles and its applicability to the situation in China had been stressed. The anarchic nature of the organization apparently worried some leaders in Peking, however, and Minister of Public Security Hsieh Fu-chih was reported by posters to have said that establishing communes might lead to a weakening of central control.

48. The directive regarding "communes" on 19 February was one of a number issued about the same time designed to put an end to confusion. Many of these reinforced earlier orders but in stronger terms. They instructed "revolutionary" forces to disband organizations not approved by the central committee, to stop attacking party officials, and to include important party officials in take-over organizations. Their tone and substance was reflected in a speech reportedly given by Chou En-lai to Red Guards on 17 February.

49. According to poster accounts, Chou denounced "rebels" for seizing government ministries without central committee approval. He specifically mentioned the Finance Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, and the Ministry of Public Security as organizations in which seizure of power "cannot be recognized." Chou angrily criticized "rebel" attempts to arrest the minister of commerce after he had been invited by Chou to "rest" and declared that this action was like issuing a warrant "against the party central committee."

50. Chou again deplored "revolutionary" excesses committed against veteran government and party officials. Parading them around in dunce caps could not be condoned, he said, and went on to declare that such "uncivilized" treatment was not necessary "even against Peng Chen." Chou criticized three powerful and militant Red Guard organizations by name, citing the "low quality" of the posters they had put up all over China. He said that the central committee did

not necessarily agree with these posters. This remark, together with Chou's criticism of irresponsible accusations and his statement that the list of party officials to be attacked should be "boiled down," implied that Peking had decided to start dismantling extremist organizations.

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The Role of Chou En-lai

52. There is insufficient evidence to reach a confident conclusion with regard to Chou En-lai's motivation and role during the period of revolutionary retreat. He was clearly in the thick of things, however, and the fact that the shift toward a more moderate course in February reflects the relatively conservative position Chou has taken since last August suggests that he had gained the initiative at the center.

53. Chou has been notable as a defender of individuals under attack by "rebel" Red Guards, and has repeatedly supported officials who were part of his power base within the government structure. He has also backed a number of military leaders who appeared to be in trouble. Chou has gone along with the main line of the Cultural Revolution but his statements have been more moderate than those of Lin Piao, Chiang Ching, Chen Po-ta, and other Maoist spokesmen. He has repeatedly stressed the importance of maintaining production and has come out against "excesses," underscoring the necessity of "treating the illness to save the patient."

54. It seems likely that the flow of events placed Chou in a key position, in part at least by default, and that he argued successfully for the retention of surviving authorities in the second or third

echelon of the provincial and regional hierarchies. These men were doubtless regarded by the Maoists as dangerously tainted with revisionism but their skills and experience made them indispensable in halting the trend toward anarchy and in dealing with practical problems such as getting the vital spring planting done.

55. Mao and Lin Piao had from the outset been publicly committed to a violent course aimed at achieving radical changes of the most sweeping kind and their commitment had led to an accretion of power in the hands of the most radical elements in the Chinese body politic. This would have made it very difficult to get agreement on a shift toward moderation. Chou's counsel may have been endorsed by a number of important military leaders and his efforts at persuasion were probably strengthened in any case by doubts which almost certainly existed at the center concerning the loyalty of the armed forces in all circumstances. Mao appears to have been forced to accept the need for a move toward moderation in tactics but clearly regarded it as a temporary expedient.

The Trend Toward Moderation Continues

56. The Cultural Revolution continued to lose velocity during late February and early March amid indications that order was being restored. Essential services provided by the government, seriously disrupted from December on, were again available in most places by February. The Red Guard apparatus was being gradually modified and in some cases dismantled.

57. On 22 February Chou En-lai addressed a mass meeting of university Red Guards in Peking and repeatedly cited Mao as the authority for what clearly was an effort to weld the disparate revolutionary groups together into a more manageable organization.

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58. On 6 March Peking radio put its stamp of approval on the dissolution of city-wide "revolutionary" organizations in the Shantung city of Tsingtao. The governing revolutionary committee in Tsingtao had directed on 2 March that the headquarters of rebel organizations be disbanded and the "tripartite alliances" of rebels, army elements, and party cadres be formed within work units. In its announcement, Peking acknowledged that disorder had resulted when workers within a unit belonged to different--and often antagonistic--revolutionary organizations.

25X1 59. Efforts to get the economy rolling again, especially in the vital agricultural sector, began to be evident. [redacted]

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25X1 [redacted] A Red Flag article broadcast by Peking on 27 February laid out what amounted to a blueprint for the role of the military in restoring order. The article identified "anarchism" as the chief danger--an implicit criticism of Maoist revolutionaries--and underscored the importance of production. People's Daily, in an editorial broadcast on 1 March, again

made the case for unity and opposed extremism and anarchy.

The "Rebels" Strike Back

61. Efforts to let the steam out of Mao's Cultural Revolution and to move China back toward something like normalcy were not unopposed.

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[redacted] on 25 February a wall newspaper reported that nine secondary-level officials had been displayed and denounced at a rally of 100,000 Red Guards, workers, and troops at the Workers' Stadium in Peking. This was the first such public humiliation of officials since mid-February when Chou En-lai had declared that Mao deplored "uncivilized" treatment of his enemies. On 9 March posters and wall newspapers appeared all over Peking denouncing Tan Chen-lin, the agricultural specialist on the politburo.

63. Tan was the first senior party official to come under fire since the Cultural Revolution began to subside at the end of January. Posters attacking him were signed by revolutionary groups in numerous government ministries, suggesting that the campaign against him had high-level approval. Tan was accused of having "deceived" Chou En-lai and of having attempted to moderate the Cultural Revolution in the countryside.

64. The depth and seriousness of the renewed conflict at the center over the question of moderating the Cultural Revolution was indicated by a major Red Flag editorial broadcast on 10 March. The editorial complained that militant revolutionaries were not being given a large enough role in the new revolutionary governing bodies being set up throughout China. Some of these bodies, it warned, have "compromised with class enemies" by allowing too many party officials, including "some who have not repented," to help run the new organizations. Red Flag predicted that this would lead to "new seesaw battles," an implicit threat

that attacks on what was left of the party apparatus outside the capital would be resumed.

65. Attacks on Tan Chen-lin continued on 11 March with a rally held to denounce him at the Ministry of State Farms. A poster was observed on 11 March stating that past statements by high officials defending Tan had been withdrawn. He had come under sporadic poster attack in previous months but had been defended by both Chou En-lai and Madame Mao in January. On 14 March Tan was denounced again by 100,000 parading Red Guards, workers, and troops. In these attacks he was linked with fallen party leaders Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, and the disciplined character of the demonstration indicated that it had official sanction.

66. Two more vice premiers joined Tan Chen-lin as targets for criticism on 15 and 16 March. On these days posters went up attacking Finance Minister Li Hsien-nien and Li Fu-chun, who is in charge of state planning. Like Tan, both men are politburo members, and Li Fu-chun is also on the standing committee. Neither of these men was attacked as violently as Tan, and posters defending them as "good students of Mao" appeared along with those criticizing them.

67. The development was clearly regarded in a serious light, however, and may have been an oblique attack on Chou En-lai himself since all three men were his close associates and worked under his direction. Many defensive sounding posters asserting that Chou "follows the revolutionary line laid down by Chairman Mao" were displayed in Peking on 16 March--the same day that an editorial appeared in the Shanghai Wen Hui Pao--a newspaper in the vanguard of the Cultural Revolution last year--castigating those who had said the Red Guards were "overdoing it" and stating flatly that anyone who criticized the guards for their relatively few mistakes was opposing the Cultural Revolution. Chou may have been the indirect target of this editorial in that he has on several occasions taken the Red Guards sharply to task for their excesses.

68. Efforts to work out an accommodation with leaders in the strategic border regions such as Sinkiang came under fire in posters put up in Peking on 18 March by powerful Red Guard groups. These posters,

which were put up all over the city, denounced Sinkiang military and party boss Wang En-mao and demanded his dismissal. Wang, a die-hard opponent of pro-Maoist revolutionaries, had been reported by a Sinkiang broadcast on 12 March to have met with Mao and Lin Piao in what may have been a move toward compromise. Wang was described in this broadcast as a "good cadre."

The Central Committee Meets

69. Posters put up in Peking on 16 March quoted Nieh Yuan-tzu, a radical female Red Guard leader who is an important member of the Maoist faction, as declaring that the central committee and the military affairs committee of that group were meeting and that the atmosphere was one of "struggle." According to the posters, Nieh declared that it was the most important stage of the revolution since the "rebel" drive began in January. The main question, she said, was who is to hold power.

70. Another ultramilitant Red Guard leader, Kuai Ta-fu, was quoted by a poster as describing the situation as the "lull before the decisive battle." Major Red Guard newspapers circulated in Peking claimed that a "reactionary adverse current" was running from the top to the bottom of the regime--almost certainly a reference to the trend toward damping down the Cultural Revolution which had been gaining strength since 1 February.

71. These meetings probably lasted about a week and it seems likely that they were similar to the central committee "work conference" held during an earlier period of tension and discord in October 1966.

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72. Chou En-lai reportedly told a foreign newsmen sometime around 1 April that Liu Shao-chi had attended the central committee session in "mid-March" and had been "put in minority seven times." Chou remarked that he was postponing plans for a trip abroad because there would be "great events in China in the next two months."

The Interim Course

73. Developments in late March and early April suggest that, during coming weeks and perhaps for the next few months, efforts to maintain order in the provinces, to construct new administrative machinery on the wreckage of the shattered government and party apparatus, and to get vital economic work done will continue.

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[REDACTED] On 22 March Chou En-lai told a conference of industrial and mining workers in Peking that industry was the "leading factor" in the economy and urged them to emulate and surpass the efforts of the peasants engaged in farm work. The conference adopted a resolution calling upon workers to maintain the eight-hour work day and to participate in the Cultural Revolution only "during nonworking hours."

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[REDACTED] Madame Mao and Chou En-lai told a rally of middle-school Red Guards in Peking on 25 March that from then on they were to "make revolution" in school. A resolution issued by the newly formed Red Guard Congress informed the students that they were to keep an eye on the country "from their classrooms."

76. On both 19 and 22 March Chou En-lai was the main speaker at congresses of mass organizations. A major theme stressed on these occasions was the need for early formation of a revolutionary committee to govern the city of Peking. What may be the model for new provincial government machinery--a provincial revolutionary committee--had emerged about a week earlier in Shansi Province and was publicized by Peking on 23 March. This organization has taken over and consolidated tasks previously carried out by the bureaucracy and party apparatus, and includes seven former provincial and municipal-level officials in leadership positions. The senior army political commissar appeared to be the real power. He chaired the Shansi congress and was elected ranking vice chairman of the committee.

"Rebel" Counterpressure

77. Indications that the February trend toward comparative moderation was still continuing were accompanied by evidence that militant "rebel" elements had been instructed to get the revolution back into high gear and rolling ahead once again. A new attack was launched against the discredited Liu Shao-chi, once number two in the party and still nominally chief of state, and against Teng Hsiao-ping--still technically head of the party secretariat but clearly without real power since the August 1966 plenum.

78. Both these men had been under vicious attack in posters, Red Guard newspapers, and rallies since December. On 30 March they began to come under even heavier fire from the propaganda vehicles of the central committee, Red Flag, and People's Daily. The official news agency, NCNA, carried voluminous accounts of rallies and demonstrations at which thousands of well-disciplined marchers shouted "down with Liu and Teng."

79. The new assault on Liu and Teng has thus far been carried on mainly in the capital and has, for the most part, involved only major figures in the hierarchy. If the attacks are in preparation for formal public action to strip these men of official position and drum them out of the party, as seems likely, they could be the prelude to political interment for a host of lesser figures still holding positions in the party

apparatus--which was staffed and managed by Liu and Teng for more than a decade.

80. A larger and more immediate purpose of the campaign against the "Liu-Teng gang" is probably to rekindle enthusiasm for the Cultural Revolution, get it in motion throughout the country once more, and thus to bolster the position of the extremist militants. Militant Red Guard groups, under pressure and apparently in decline during the February retreat from revolution, have become active once more and their leaders--people like Nieh Yuan-tzu and Kuai Ta-fu--are again asserting themselves. Unheard from for many weeks prior to mid-March, they have since been passing judgment on men in high places, declaring which ones should be "watched carefully," which can hope to be excused if they repent and reform, and which are outside the pale of redemption.

81. Continuing parallel attacks on officials associated with Chou En-lai and on high-ranking military leaders may indicate that these men, successful proponents of moderation in February, are resisting a return to the violent and disorderly course taken by the Cultural Revolution up to the end of January. The continuing emphasis on Mao's injunction to "pursue the tottering foe" suggests that cautious elements in Peking are arguing that the Revolution has already achieved its major purpose and should now be conducted more deliberately and at a lower pitch.

Prospects

82. The immediate outcome of the latest developments in Peking is impossible to predict, beyond a general forecast of continued confusion with new "twists and turns" in the months ahead. Communist China now appears to be ruled by a very small and disunited group of leaders operating under a triumvirate in which Mao probably plays the dominant role--when he chooses and is physically able. It seems likely that both the shadowy Lin Piao and Chou En-lai, in subordinate but powerful and probably antagonistic positions, make independent self-serving decisions when circumstances permit.

83. The immediate objective of those at the top in Peking at present is probably to construct new administrative machinery from the wreckage of the shattered

party and government apparatus. This is proceeding fitfully and at a snail's pace, which suggests that conflicting factions are striving for future dominance by placing their own adherents in key positions within the new political structure.

84. Such a situation is basically unstable and might result in a violent struggle at the center which could conceivably lead to civil war. The course of events during January and early February when resistance in the provinces was subdued and differences were compromised under the aegis of the armed forces, however, makes this seem unlikely.

85. During that period of turmoil the military establishment as a whole opted for stability and national unity. Despite indications that some high-ranking leaders sided with provincial and regional authorities against Peking, there was no evidence of wavering basic loyalty in the officer corps at large or among the rank and file, or of any disposition to support a movement toward secession. The PLA has remained a united and functional organization throughout the course of the Cultural Revolution. When the armed forces intervened it was in general on the side of order and central authority, and on balance it seems probable that they would do so again in reacting to a split at the center. This is a reflection of the extent to which China has become a modern nation-state.

The Seeds of Patriotism

86. The process started with the Western incursion into China about a hundred years ago. It was carried forward by the reformers of the late 19th century, given new impetus and direction by the nationalist revolutionaries who sought to fill the political vacuum left by the collapse of the empire in 1911. Japan served as a catalyst, first in demonstrating that an Asian nation could stand as an equal with the powers of the West, and later as the focus of national enmity during the Japanese attempt to conquer China.

87. Utilizing the foundations constructed by Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang with these materials,

the Communists established a new state in 1949 with a political structure fundamentally different from any which had previously existed in China. Under it the people once despairingly described by Sun Yat-sen as a "heap of loose sand" have finally become united and given a sense of national purpose after decades of bloody and turbulent struggle. In doing this Mao and his comrades were reaping a harvest sown by their predecessors.

"New China"

88. The Communists imposed a government which for the first time in Chinese history reached all the people and directly affected their lives. Rule under the empire had always been autocratic and Peking was the ultimate center of authority but the force of government was applied locally by a county magistrate--the only official an average Chinese ever saw--working through clan and family channels. The general lines of policy were established by the imperial court, transmitted downward through a mandarinate of approximately 10,000 scholar officials, and interpreted by provincial authorities who exercised a great deal of autonomy. The functioning of the system for most of the people, most of the time, was quite accurately described by the folk saying, "The sun is in the heavens and the emperor is far away."

89. Under the new Communist rule the bureaucracy reached the village level and operated from detailed directives passed down through a disciplined and pervasive chain of command which at the same time kept Peking informed of events at the lowest level. Communications were developed to a point which made it theoretically possible for a village cadre to talk on the telephone with Mao himself. Closed-circuit loudspeaker systems were installed in both rural and urban areas to pass propaganda from the center directly to the people.

90. The regime launched a vigorous and effective attack on illiteracy, using simplified characters and other devices, and made progress toward establishing a national language. These tools were used to indoctrinate the population with Marxist ideology and at the same time to foster the growth of Western-style nationalism.

91. National feeling and popular identification with the regime were further enhanced by the economic and social achievements of the new regime. The over-all improvement of the economic situation was in large part the result of reconstruction and restoration of public order but the results achieved provided a practical demonstration of the value of national unity. China was not transformed into a land of milk and honey, but at least there was no mass starvation. The early social reforms instituted by the regime were harsh but they destroyed genuine evils--oppression by landlords and money lenders, the remnants of traditional family system--and were welcomed by the population as a whole. The social services provided by the new regime--schools, clinics, courts, public welfare services--while not impressive by Western standards, were better and more abundant than anything known previously in China.

92. Finally, the Communists created a modern national army, based on the principle of universal conscription, to replace the essentially regional armed forces with which they had won the revolution. Such an army is a powerful unifying force, particularly when it has a major stake in preserving the state mechanism.

93. Chiang Kai-shek made progress in all of these areas and had it not been for the Japanese attack might have been able to create a unified state. It is likely that the Communist leaders regard their own success in doing so as the greatest single achievement of their regime. A conviction that political unity is vitally important--a belief probably now shared by a majority of the Chinese people--is the root of the basic consensus that seems likely to hold China together.

ANNEXRecent Developments in Regional Party Bureaus,
Military Regions, and ProvincesNORTH CHINA BUREAU

First Secretary Li Hsueh-feng was portrayed in February and March posters as a "category three" official, i.e., one who has committed serious errors but is being given a chance to serve in a lesser role. It is doubtful if he retains significant authority. Li was under heavy and sustained attack by Red Guards, through posters and demonstrations, in October and November (in his concurrent role of first secretary of the Peking city party committee). He apparently was replaced in his Peking job in that period by his deputy, Wu Te.

Little was heard of Li after November until 31 January when Chou En-lai was quoted in a poster as saying that Li was on probation and had been sent to Tientsin to clear up a troublesome situation. The position of weakness from which Li is operating was clearly indicated by a contrite statement he made at a Tientsin rally on 18 March. Li said if he was "able to engage in useful work in Tientsin and correct his past mistakes" he would owe it all to the invincible thought of Mao. By late March, however, Li was in deep trouble again.

Shortly after the official campaign against Liu Shao-chi was launched, poster attacks on Li Hsueh-feng were resumed.

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In January and February, there were many reports detailing clashes involving Red Guard groups in the city of Peking, in other cities in Hopeh, and in the capital city of Inner Mongolia. Shansi has been quiet.

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PEKING MILITARY REGION (Peking City, Shansi, and Hopeh)

Peking commander Yang Yung came under attack on 22 January for denouncing the army's political boss, Hsiao Hua, on 19 January. Hsiao was defended by top leaders on 21 and 22 January. On 31 January, Chen Po-ta stated that Yang posed an "extremely grave" problem. On the same day Chou En-lai accused Yang of "plotting to cause confusion." A Red Guard newspaper on 7 February reported that Yang had been dismissed. His political commissar, Liao Han-sheng, was charged early in January of plotting a military coup with the Ho Lung group.

Peking City

Wu Te, who replaced Li Hsueh-feng in October or November, was described in posters in late February as a "comparatively good" cadre. Wu had been criticized from time to time and was briefly "arrested" by Red Guards in mid-January. On 20 January, however, Madame Mao sternly ordered the Guards to release Wu and let him go back to work. On 2 March a Peking broadcast identified Wu as a leading member of the "Peking municipality."

The broadcast avoided naming the governing body Wu leads, but posters said he still headed the party committee, by then a nearly powerless body. Posters in late January stated that a Paris-style commune

was being formed for Peking. However, Mao and other officials soon were being quoted as saying that the idea of a commune was premature.

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Hopeh

Liu Tzu-hou, who became first secretary in October, was paraded in late January in a humiliating way, according to a picture in a Red Guard newspaper. The accompanying newspaper story accused Liu of causing a "bloody incident" on 21 January.

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Clashes between opposing factions were reported in four major provincial cities in January and February. In several cases, PLA forces were sent in to restore order. On 18 February a poster reported that the PLA had assumed control over the Tientsin Public Security Bureau. Thus, the situation in this province appears to have been resolved by the use of the military.

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Shansi

The party committee and government were abolished on 12 January and replaced with a "revolutionary committee." The former first secretary Wei Heng apparently was not retained in a leading position. He and four other party leaders were criticized at a rally in Taiyuan on 5 February. All except Wei were then publicly paraded.

The chairman of the new "revolutionary committee" is former vice governor Liu Ko-ping. The party is said to be playing a unique role in Shansi, although only one of the 11 former secretaries has yet emerged in good standing. The Shansi "revolutionary committee," unlike those set up elsewhere, is being run jointly by a "CCP Shansi core group" and the revolutionary rebels. The deputy head of the core group is Chang Jih-ching, political commissar of the Shansi military district. Other members named so far include Liu Ko-ping, Jen Chen, a former provincial secretary and concurrently first secretary of Taiyuan city, and Liu Kuan-i, an apparently minor official whose former post is unknown. Liu Kuan-i is general secretary of the core group.

Chou En-lai and Cultural Revolution official Wang Li have singled out Liu Ko-ping as one of the few "good cadres" in China. Liu's chief merit, according to Wang Li, is that he was once "oppressed" by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. Liu Ko-ping was the first secretary of Ninghsia until 1960 when he was dismissed for "rightist tendencies" and given the unimportant post of vice governor in Shansi.

Peking's claim that Mao's enemies in Shansi had struggled desperately before their defeat in January may be largely fabricated.

In previous months there had been no reports of any kind of trouble in Shansi. In line with the key role assigned by Peking to the military in power seizures in late January, the PLA in Shansi received effusive praise for the part it allegedly played in the take-over.

NORTHEAST BUREAU

The party apparatus of this region, which Mao reportedly selected as a model area, has emerged from the Cultural Revolution the least damaged of any in China. First Secretary Sung Jen-chiung was praised by Peking as a leading revolutionary cadre and played a leading role in the formation of the Heilungkiang revolutionary committee established in early February. He was defended from Red Guard criticism last October by Chou En-lai, who may be his chief sponsor in Peking. Three of the bureau's 12 secretaries have also emerged in their former positions, but appear to be functioning as observers rather than leaders.

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SHENYANG MILITARY REGION (coterminous with the North-east Bureau)

Commander Chen Hsi-lien showed up at several major rallies last fall, and presumably has sided with Maoist forces, although he has not appeared in 1967.

Heilungkiang

Pan Fu-sheng, first secretary of the former provincial party committee, was named director of the "Heilungkiang Provincial Revolutionary Committee" established on 31 January, and is the only provincial first secretary to have survived a revolutionary take-over. Pan's background indicates that he is a special case, however. He was dismissed as first secretary of Honan for "rightist" errors in 1958 and relegated to an obscure position in Peking until the spring of 1966 when he unexpectedly emerged as first secretary of Heilung-kiang. This record suggests that he has been out of favor with Liu and

A-7

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Teng for years; his reinstatement in 1966 probably was a sign that their power was already weakening. Pan was praised by Chou En-lai last fall.

Wang Chia-tao, commander of the Heilung-kiang Military District, is deputy director of the new revolutionary committee. Second secretary Li Fan-wu and Li Chien-pei, a secretary, were dismissed in September 1966. Nine other secretaries have dropped from sight and by now it is doubtful whether few, if any, have survived.

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Kirin

The first secretary is unknown. Chao Lin, second secretary, was named acting first secretary in June 1966 when the then first secretary, Wu Te, was transferred to Peking. Chao has not appeared since 2 September, but he has also not been under attack, and thus may still hold an authoritative position in the province. In mid-January a poster charged that Wu Te had attempted to establish an "independent kingdom" in Kirin during his reign, a charge not replayed in official media or Red Guard newspapers. In early February Radio Peking stated that local PLA troops had been ordered to intervene on behalf of the rebels in Changchun in late January, when, according to posters, the rebels

fought a four-day battle to seize control of the Kirin Daily, the public security bureau, and other organs. A revolutionary take-over at Kirin has not been announced, but recent broadcasts from Changchun indicate that a "revolutionary committee" may be imminent.

Liaoning

Both first secretary Huang Huo-ching and second secretary - governor Huang Ho-tung have been out of sight for more than a year. Huang Huo-ching, in his role as a secretary of the Northeast party bureau, was attacked on 6 January for "misdemeanors" in Liaoning, and posters were noted on 21 January calling for the removal of Huang Ho-tung. Neither official media nor authoritative Red Guard newspapers have replayed these possibly isolated attacks.

Other party officials who have been attacked are the Shenyang first secretary, Yang Chun-pu, for "opposition activities" in early January, and eight Luta (Dairen) party officials who were paraded at a rally in Luta on 22 January. No revolutionary cadre (party people) have been noted active in Liaoning. A rally in Shenyang on 27 February was attended by Hu Chieh, described as a secretary of the Northeast Bureau, Yang Chih, representing the Liaoning Military District, and another military figure from the Shenyang PLA units.

The apparent lack of activity may be due to confusion stemming from a continuing local power struggle. Peking radio and posters stated that PLA troops intervened on behalf of the rebels in late January. On 15 February posters appeared in Peking charging that PLA troops were "suppressing"

[redacted]

rebel Red Guards in the Dairen area.

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[redacted] shipping facilities at the port have returned to normal.

The Liaoning Military District commander, Ho Ching-wu, has not been noted for over a year. The complete absence to date of any of the pre - Cultural Revolution military officials, however, could indicate that the provincial military establishment may have been shaken up.

-10-

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NORTHWEST BUREAU

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[redacted] confirm that first secretary Liu Lan-tao, under bitter Red Guard attack since August 1966, and a majority of the Northwest secretariat have been paraded in disgrace. Liu has been denounced by a high Cultural Revolution official in Peking as a "bad hat" and probably has been ousted from office. Liu and 42 bureau and provincial officials were publicly humiliated on 23 January and have been frequently paraded in the streets of Sian since then. None of the 11 bureau secretaries has yet been endorsed by Peking as a "good cadre." Only three appear to have escaped direct criticism.

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[redacted]
With the exception of Ninghsia, this area has been the scene of consistent and much-publicized strife since mid-December. Militant Red Guards appear to have had more success here than in any other area in China.

LANCHOW MILITARY REGION (Kansu, Ninghsia, Shensi, and Tsinghai)

Commander Chang Ta-chih and his political commissar, Hsien Heng-han, were attacked in early February for suppressing rebel activities in Kansu and Lanchow. The rebels charged that the sons of Chang and Hsien were leading "counterrevolutionary" organizations. The rebels also charged that the Kansu Daily and the Lanchow radio station were nothing more than "mouthpieces" for the military.

25X1

SINKIANG MILITARY REGION

The status of Commander Wang En-mao, who is concurrently the party first secretary, is discussed below in the Sinkiang section.

A-11

25X1

Sinkiang

First secretary Wang En-mao appears to have reached an uneasy compromise with Peking in February after many months of sustained Red Guard attacks on him. That anti-Wang campaign culminated in serious disorders in December and January involving the large Production-Construction Army in Sinkiang. Sinkiang has been quiet since late January, however, when Wang reportedly was working out an agreement in Peking with Chou En-lai. Several times during March and April the Sinkiang provincial radio station reported that Wang attended rallies in Urumchi, still holding all his old positions. These broadcasts, confirming earlier poster accounts of a Wang-Chou agreement, said that the Sinkiang situation had been stabilized on the basis of a 12-point directive prepared by Chou and endorsed by Mao and Lin. Red Guard newspapers had reported that such a directive had been issued on 11 February.

Wang's position still seems insecure, however. Peking media have not reported that Wang is still in place or repeated Urumchi radio's accounts of Wang's activities. Sporadic Red Guard attacks on Wang continued in Peking after Wang resurfaced in Urumchi, and on 16 April detailed poster attacks on Liu Shao-chi accused Wang En-mao and other Northwest leaders of plotting with Liu last spring, when Liu visited Sinkiang en route to Pakistan. The resurgence of a radical atmosphere in Peking since mid-March suggests that the status of all compromises reached during the February period of moderation, such as the one with Wang, is now being questioned by militant elements in the leadership.

A-12

Tsinghai

Both first secretary Wang Chih-lin and second secretary Wang Chao have probably suffered the same fate as most other top party leaders in the Northwest Bureau area.

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[redacted] radio-broadcasts indicate that the province has been governed by the Tsinghai Military District since February.

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A-13

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Tsinghai

Liu Hsien-chuan, commander of the Tsinghai Military District since 1963, was noted active in Hsining on 15 April, his first appearance since October. His role in the "suppression" of rebel activities in the province during February is unknown; he may have prudently stayed in the background, letting subordinates carry out the orders.

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Shensi

First secretary Huo Shih-lien and second secretary Chao Shou-i were paraded in Sian in late January and February. Chao had been dismissed in September; Huo undoubtedly is now out. At least two members of the nine-member secretariat were also paraded.

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[redacted] major provincial officials had been ousted, with "revolutionaries" occupying all administrative positions. Hu Ping-yun, commander of the Shensi Military District, has not been noted under attack.

25X1

[redacted] PLA appeared to be taking a neutral stance in Sian, not aiding either the revolutionaries (most of whom appeared to be students), or the "opposition" (composed mostly of workers).

25X1

There have been numerous disorders reported in Sian since the start of the Cultural Revolution. The "incidents" have usually resulted from rebel attacks

A-14

25X1

on the party committees of the Northwest Bureau, Shensi, and Sian city. In mid-January, according to Sian radio broadcasts, the rebels seized control of the three party committees. Shensi has not been recognized as a true take-over by Peking, and appears to have been little affected by the recent phase of moderation. The dominance of the revolutionaries suggests that Shensi may represent a "problem" area with which Peking intends to deal after the Cultural Revolution ends in other places.

Kansu

First secretary Wang Feng, who last showed up in public on 1 October 1966, appears to have been sacrificed to pro-Mao forces in November or December.

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[REDACTED] On 7 February a wall poster identified his replacement as Hu Chi-tsung, formerly a secretary in the Kansu party committee, and then stated that Hu was "Tao Chu's timebomb in the Northwest."

The same poster charged that the Kansu party committee, in collusion with the Military District Commander and Lanchow Military Region officials, had suppressed revolutionaries near Lanchow in late January. On 11 February a poster charged that the Kansu Military District had "conspired" with the party committee in order to repress the rebels. The sons of the Lanchow Military Region commander, Chang Ta-chih, and Political Commissar Hsien Heng-han were accused of leading counterrevolutionary organizations in Lanchow and Kansu. Currently, the military appears to be in charge of the province. No prominent military or political figures have been mentioned in broadcasts in 1967.

25X1

[redacted] Poster attacks indicate that a number of incidents occurred in and around Lanchow in late January and early February. However, most of these incidents probably involved attacks on low-level bureaucrats,

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Ninghsia

A quiet, unimportant area. First secretary Yang Ching-jen last appeared 1 October at National Day celebrations. [redacted]

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[redacted] In late January a poster in Peking stated that the Ninghsia Daily was one of several provincial newspapers that the rebels had seized.

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A-16

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EAST CHINA BUREAU

The post of first secretary has been unfilled since the death of Ko Ching-shih in April 1965. Five of the East China Bureau's six secretaries have been severely criticized; two have been officially dismissed from office. Even the two alternate secretaries came under attack in January.

The heavy casualties apparently suffered by the East China party apparatus may be due in part to the fact that Teng Hsiao-ping probably ran the bureau until his political downfall in August 1966. Thereafter, Tao Chu, former Central-South party boss who was promoted into the standing committee in August, reportedly tried to extend his influence into the East China Bureau.

There was widespread disorder and some bloody fighting in East China in December and January. Party leaders under attack incited workers to riot and strike, and managed to disrupt railroad services and production.

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[redacted] much of the region was in administrative chaos for weeks. However, order was restored by February.

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TSINAN MILITARY REGION (Shantung)

Although the political commissar, Tan Chi-lung, was officially dismissed on 4 February from his positions, the commander of the region, Yang Te-chih, spoke at a 1 March rally, and the Tsinan Military Region itself is being acclaimed for its role in the Shantung seizure in early February.

NANKING MILITARY REGION (Kiangsu, Shanghai City, Anhwei, Chekiang)

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Red Guard posters criticized this military region and, indirectly, its commander, Hsu Shih-yu, for failing promptly to back Maoist forces in early January.

25X1

FOOCHOW MILITARY REGION (Fukien, Kiangsi)

The identity of the commander is uncertain. Yeh Fei, who is concurrently political commissar and first secretary of the Fukien party committee, was last identified as commander in 1962. The ranking military professional in the province, Han Hsien-chu, was named deputy chief of staff in 1965, and may have replaced Yeh Fei. Nevertheless, Han, who was the leading speaker at a "victory" rally staged by revolutionaries in Foochow on 11 February, was identified only as a "responsible member of PLA units on the Fukien front." The status of Yeh Fei is unclear. He was under attack by local Red Guards from August to December but authoritative Red Guard newspapers in Peking have not mentioned him. Peking has praised the leading role of the PLA in the "triple alliance" in Fukien, indicating that military authorities in this region are supported by the central leadership.

Shantung

First Secretary Tan Chi-lung was officially ousted in early February at the time of the announced take-over of the provincial party and governmental administration. Credit for the take-over has been given to Wang Hsiao-wu, an unknown who is now described as the leading party official in Shantung, and to the commanders of the Tsinan Military Region. Information on other emerging leaders suggests that obscure government administrators are playing a leading role in the new Shantung revolutionary committee.

In January there were numerous reports of clashes in the port city of Tsingtao, but elsewhere in Shantung there has been little evidence of violence.

Anhwei

After sustained attacks on First Secretary Li Pao-hua dating back to late August, Hofei radio announced the dismissal of Li and four other ranking leaders on 26 January. Li has been included in semiofficial lists of both Liu-Teng followers and the Tao Chu group.

On 26 January, the provincial broadcasting station announced the rebel take-over of provincial party and government organs. Peking has never officially recognized this take-over. It is possible that the regime cannot agree on who is to lead this province.

Recent and frequent appearances of high-level military district leaders suggest that the PLA is running Anhwei. However, two secretaries of the former provincial CCP committee showed up in late March and probably hold posts in the new provincial administration.

Kiangsu

The provincial leadership has not been attacked, which is puzzling in light of the considerable violence and confusion which occurred in the province during January. First Secretary Chiang Wei-ching was active throughout 1966. During the first three months of the year he attended seven military conferences, suggesting he was aligned with PLA forces in his area. Even in late December, when most first secretaries had disappeared from public view, Chiang made two official appearances in his

province. Chiang is one of the few provincial leaders who has not been linked with the Liu-Teng or Tao Chu groups.

Posters in early January reported Nanking to be the site of violent clashes between "rebel factions" and "loyalist factions." Probably exaggerated accounts of incidents stated 54 persons were killed, 900 wounded, and as many as 10,000 persons involved in heavy fighting. Poster accounts attributed responsibility for the violence to different persons. According to one account, Chou En-lai charged Tao Chu and the Kiangsu and East China Bureau CCP committees with responsibility. Another poster claimed that senior party officials in Shanghai had urged workers to go to Nanking and create disturbances.

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Nanking radio ceased broadcasting local news on 7 January and did not end this blackout until 18 February when it issued an announcement on an alleged take-over of the Kiangsu broadcasting station on 26 January. Since then, however, broadcasting has returned to normal. The only provincial officials appearing in public since January have been leaders of the Kiangsu Military District. Thus, the fate of the party leaders in Kiangsu remains unclear.

Shanghai

First Secretary Chen Pei-hsien and Mayor Tsao Ti-chiu were paraded in disgrace in

A-20

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[Redacted]

January after the party committee was abolished. Rallies were still being held during February to denounce Chen and Tsao for their alleged use of economic inducements to "buy" support from workers in Shanghai.

Throughout January the Shanghai take-over was acclaimed as a model for other areas, but Peking's enthusiasm dimmed during February, when considerable administrative disorder persisted. On 5 February, a Shanghai People's Commune was formed and two members of the Cultural Revolution Group in Peking, Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan, were sent down to head it. In late February, however, Shanghai radio announced that the name "commune" had been changed to the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee, in line with Peking's orders Chang and Yao were described as "leading members" of the renamed organization.

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[Redacted]
the city was in constant turmoil from August 1966 through February 1967, although economic and social order does not seem to have seriously broken down at any time.

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[Redacted]
demonstrations in Shanghai were completely chaotic, in contrast with the well-organized and disciplined demonstrations recently seen in Peking.

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[Redacted]

Chekiang

This province has been one of the quietest areas in China during the current period of upheaval. Neither First Secretary Chiang Hua or the provincial party committee has been attacked.

A-21

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There have been no reports of rebel take-overs in Chekiang, and Hangchow radio was one of the few in China which continued broadcasting local news during the confused weeks of late January. Although Chiang Hua has not made a public appearance since September 1966, he may emerge in good standing. Military leaders are the only persons who have reappeared in the last two months.

Fukien

First Secretary Yeh Fei was the subject of severe Red Guard criticism throughout the fall of 1966, but significant attacks on him have not appeared in recent months and his position in Fukien is unclear.

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On 16 February, Peking reported on a "victory rally" in Fukien on 11 February, implying but not stating that it was held to celebrate a rebel take-over. Han Hsien-chun, a major officer or possibly the commander of the Foochow Military Region, presided over the rally. Wei Chin-shui, governor and a party secretary of Fukien, and representatives of the 29 August rebels also spoke at the rally. Just three days earlier, on 8 February, a Foochow broadcast had condemned the 29 August rebels for launching an attack on the Fukien Daily.

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The forces behind the attacks on Wei and the 29 August group may have been either ultraleftists who lost out or entrenched party figures under Yeh Fei.

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The situation in Fukien as of mid-April is difficult to assess inasmuch as Foo-chow radio has been reporting very little local news since 13 February.

Kiangsi

First Secretary Yang Shang-kuei dropped out of sight in 1965 and may have been replaced long before the latest phase of the Cultural Revolution. If so, his replacement has never been publicly identified. No senior party official in the province has come under Red Guard attack. On the other hand, none has emerged since revolutionary rebels seized power and abolished the party committee on 26 January. This seizure was reported by Nanchang Radio, but like several other take-overs announced by provincial radios in January, it has not been acknowledged by Peking. Recently broadcast listings of what may be new leaders include only minor military, party, and government officials.

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claimed that city officials had created chaotic conditions and as a result industry was paralyzed and railroad service was disrupted. Broadcasts and posters in January alleged that entrenched party officials had organized a 200,000-man "peasants red militia army" to attack the pro-Maoists, but the existence of such a group has not been confirmed.

A-23

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CENTRAL SOUTH BUREAU

Tao Chu had developed a strong following in this region which he headed before he was brought into the inner circle of leaders around Mao and Lin in August 1966. Consequently, when Tao fell from favor at the end of December, his replacement in the regional bureau and the first secretaries in four of the region's five provinces were implicated with him. (Honan apparently had no first secretary at the time.) All have appeared in semiofficial blacklists of Tao's followers distributed in Peking in January and February.

Wang Jen-chung, the new first secretary of the Central South, was denounced by Madame Mao and other leaders at the end of December. On 4 January she told a contingent of Red Guards from Canton to go home and arrest Wang, but whether they succeeded is unknown, since nothing has been heard of his whereabouts since then.

Although a major political struggle appears to have taken place in the Central South since December, relatively little disorder has been reported. Possibly key military commanders sided with Mao and Lin from the beginning to block attempts by political leaders to resist. Some clashes were reported in Kwangtung, Honan, and Hunan, but transportation services operated throughout the region with few disruptions.

WUHAN MILITARY REGION (Hupeh, Honan)

The commander, Chen Tsai-tao, has not been attacked and appears to have remained loyal to Mao and Lin. On 2 March, Chen made an official appearance and spoke to PLA cadres on the need for them to participate in spring planting.

CANTON MILITARY REGION (Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan)

Commander Huang Yung-sheng has not appeared since 12 December 1966 and he has been implicated

by poster attacks on his command. He has long-standing ties with Lin Piao, but his promotion in 1963 under Tao Chu may cause Maoist leaders to mistrust him.

Honan

First Secretary Liu Chien-hsun, who has been in Peking since August, was identified on 4 March as a "leading member" of the Peking municipal committee. Liu's replacement in Honan has not been announced.

Honan was quiet last year. In late February and early March posters carried reports of clashes between the PLA and the rebels. However, the trouble seems merely to have involved attempts by local military authorities, apparently on orders from Peking, to put down unruly Red Guard groups. Although these groups complained bitterly in posters of their suppression by Chang Shu-chih, commander of the Hunan Military District, he appeared early in March, and the military has been running the province since then.

Hupeh

First Secretary Wang Jen-chung is concurrently first secretary of the Central-South Bureau. As noted above, he fell with his former boss Tao Chu at the end of December. Chang Ti-hsueh, second secretary in Hupeh, has also been severely attacked.

Military district leaders have been administering this province in recent weeks. Since early March the Hupeh military district has been issuing directives on matters ranging from afforestation and spring planting to the opening of middle schools. As yet, there has been no official announcement of a new governing unit for the province, but the PLA, presumably acting on orders from Peking, is clearly in command.

Hunan

As in Hupeh, First Secretary Chang Ping-hua and Second Secretary Wang Yen-chun have both come under serious criticism for their association with Tao Chu. Chang and Wang are included in blacklists of Tao Chu followers.

Local broadcasts have given no identification of new leading figures in this province; the military is currently being portrayed as running provincial affairs.

Kwangsi

First Secretary Wei Kuo-ching was included in one blacklist of Tao Chu followers published in a Red Guard newspaper in February, but his name is missing from other lists of this type, and no detailed denunciation of Wei has been seen.

Nanning radio announced a rebel take-over in late January which was never confirmed by Peking. Since January, only minor military officials have made public appearances, suggesting that Peking leaders have not yet decided on new leaders for Kwangsi.

Kwangtung

First Secretary Chao Tzu-yang and the majority of senior party and government leaders have been under heavy fire since Tao Chu fell. They have not been officially dismissed, but by mid-March the PLA had taken over many government and police functions and,

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the Canton and Kwangtung party committees as well.

Poster reporting on Chao Tzu-yang indicates he has made desperate efforts to survive by ingratiating himself with revolutionary forces. Following reports that he was

paraded in disgrace on 20 January, jeering posters claimed he had staged the show himself in a futile attempt to show a properly adject attitude. On 11 February, Chao, by then a pathetic figure, pleaded before a group of Red Guards that he had not been able to get in touch with the central committee in Peking recently, and therefore did not know how to respond to Red Guard demands.

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SOUTHWEST BUREAU

First Secretary Li Ching-chuan, who has been under bitter and heavy attack since the start of the Cultural Revolution, almost certainly has been brought down. Li was criticized in a speech by Madame Mao on 18 December for engaging in "spying activities" in Peking; Chou En-lai on 18 January stated that Li's "gang bosses" in the "control units" of the western district of Peking had been arrested; and a poster seen in Peking on 14 March charged Li with manipulating the Chungking municipal committee to cause the recent death of a revolutionary writer. In addition, numerous posters and Red Guard newspapers since late December have linked Li with the Ho Lung conspirators and the Liu-Teng gang. Poster photographs seen in Peking on 10 February showed Li and other officials of the Southwest Bureau being paraded by Red Guards in Chengtu, Szechwan, probably in mid-January.

Other bureau officials who have come under attack are secretaries Li Ta-chang and Liao Chih-kuo (both from Szechwan). Li Ta-chang was paraded in Chengtu, probably at the same time as Li Ching-chuan; Liao probably suffered the same fate.

CHENGTU MILITARY REGION (coterminous with Szechwan)

Commander Huang Hsin-ting, First Political Commissar Li Ching-chuan, and Second Political Commissar Kuo Lin-hsiang appeared in lists of the "Ho Lung plot group" distributed in Peking in mid-January. On 27 January a Red Guard newspaper said that Huang and Kuo had been "dismissed." Wei Chieh, Chien Chun-hua, and Li Wen-ching, deputy commanders of the Chengtu Military Region (CMR) came in for mild criticism in February under circumstances suggesting they were merely carrying out Peking's orders. A poster in Peking on 12 February charged that PLA troops had arrested rebel demonstrators in Chengtu on 11 February; these demonstrators were attacking the military region headquarters. Another poster on 25 February charged Wei Chieh and Li Wen-ching with "suppression" of rebel activities in Szechwan, implying that Wei and

Li were still exercising authority at that time. On 11 March, Radio Chengtu broadcast a short propaganda piece on spring farming, which stated that Wei Chieh, "deputy commander of the Chengtu Military Region," had joined the laborers and farmers in spring farm work; a broadcast on 5 March listed Chu Yu-ting also in his usual position as CMR chief of staff.

KUNMING MILITARY REGION (Yunnan, Kweichow)

Commander Chin Chi-wei was listed in a 20 January poster as one of the Ho Lung coup plotters.

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Tibet

First Secretary Chang Kuo-hua, also commander of the Tibet Military Region, presently appears to enjoy the support of Peking. He has not made a public appearance since the National Day celebrations in Lhasa on 1 October; however, Chang was alleged to have been in Lhasa on 3 April.

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
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[redacted] A number of lesser secretaries may have been sacrificed by Chang, perhaps in an attempt to placate rebel demands and also as a concession to Peking. On 22 January a poster admonished Chang for dismissing party secretaries Chou Jen-shan, Jen Ming-tai, and Kuo Hsi-lan. [redacted]

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Szechwan

First Secretary Liao Chih-kao has been bitterly attacked, and may have been paraded in mid-January with Li Ching-chuan and other officials. Li Ta-chang, a party secretary, and vice governor Chang Hu-chen were also paraded at this time. To date, no senior party cadres are known to be active. Military officials (from the Chengtu Military Region) are running provincial affairs. Wei Chieh, a deputy commander, and Chu Yu-ting, a deputy chief of staff, and two other Chengtu Military Region officials, are the only officials noted active in the province since early January.

A-32



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[redacted] rebels were very active in Chungking in December and January, and in at least one outlying area in January and February. Rebel endeavors have not been noted since mid-February, [redacted]

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[redacted] With the exception of pro forma announcements on spring farming, etc., Chengtu radio has maintained a virtual blackout on local activities.

Kweichow

First Secretary Chia Chi-yun, who was attacked by Red Guards last October, may have been purged; he certainly no longer holds a leading position in the province. The Kweichow party committee was abolished on 25 January, and the "Kweichow Provincial Revolutionary Committee" which replaced it is headed by a military man and a minor government functionary. It is a military-run province. The only senior party man publicly participating in the new committee is Li Li, a former provincial party secretary and governor. Other members are the commander of the Kweichow Military District, the political commissar and a number of lesser military figures. Li Tsia-han, one of the deputy political commissars, is chairman; the deputy chairman is Chang Ming, who used to be deputy chief of the province's supply bureau.

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This province has been relatively free of rebel-instigated disorders, [redacted]

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[redacted] the military appears to have kept a tight lid on the province. Although cited by Peking as an example of a revolutionary take-over, the preponderance of military officials in leading roles blatantly conflicts with the three-way model recommended by Peking, in which revolutionaries, party cadres, and the military all play important roles.

Yunnan

First Secretary Yen Hung-yen died on 8 January, probably at the hands of the Red Guards. Chou En-lai whitewashed the incident, and asserted that Yen had committed suicide. On 2 February a poster announced that the provincial and municipal (Kunming) party committees had been seized on 26 January; however, Peking has yet to recognize a revolutionary take-over in this province, and no senior party officials have been praised as "revolutionary cadres" either by Kunming Radio or by Peking. A 27 March Kunming radiobroadcast stated that revolutionaries from the Kweichow Provincial Revolutionary Committee, acting as "advisers," and "leadership comrades" from the Kunming Military Region and the Yunnan Military District were assisting the Yunnan revolutionaries on the "problems" of forming three-way alliances and organizing revolutionary organizations.


As in Kweichow and Szechwan, military officials are running provincial affairs. Li Ming, a deputy commander of the Yunnan Military District, Li Hsi-fu, a deputy political commissar, and other lesser military officials are the only politically active persons identified since January.

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CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY REGIONS



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26 APR 1967

RECORDED BY RICHARD HELMS

25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Dean Rusk
The Secretary of State
SUBJECT : Peking, the Army, and the Provincial
Authorities

25X1

1. The attached memorandum resulted from an attempt to identify potential "warlords" who might assume control of the various provinces of China should central authority break down. You will recall that we discussed this subject some time ago.

2. For several reasons it has proved impossible to single out likely leaders in many of the regions and provinces. Furthermore, in view of developments in the "Cultural Revolution" since our discussion, a return to "warlordism" in China seems unlikely.

3. The research on this subject, however, did produce a study in some depth on the roles of the Chinese hierarchy in Peking, the army, and the provincial authorities during the course of the "Cultural Revolution." In addition to pointing out the conflicts within and among these forces, the study assesses the prospects for a unified China. You may find it helpful in clarifying the complex and sometimes violent events in China in the past year or so. You may also be interested in the annex, which treats in considerable detail developments in each of China's party bureaus, military regions, and provinces.

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

25X1

Attachment: a/s

Concur:

/s/ R. J. Smith 26 APR 1967
R. J. Smith Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001900010015-9
Deputy Director for Intelligence

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
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
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DDI/OCI/Pres: [redacted] (26 Apr 67)

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26 APR 1967

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance
Deputy Secretary of Defense

25X1

SUBJECT: Peking, the Army, and the Provincial Authorities

25X1

1. The attached memorandum is a study in some depth of the roles of the Chinese hierarchy in Peking, the army, and the provincial authorities during the course of China's "Cultural Revolution." In addition to pointing out the conflicts within and among these forces, the memorandum assesses the prospects for a unified China.


2. The first four pages summarize the key points of the study. You may find this summary helpful in understanding the complex and sometimes violent developments in China in the past year or so. An annex treats in considerable detail developments in each of China's party bureaus, military regions, and provinces.

/S/

Richard Helms
Director

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Attachment: a/s



Concur:

/s/ R. J. Smith 26 APR 1967

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R. J. SMITH
Deputy Director for Intelligence

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DDI/OCL/Pres

(26 Apr 67)

The Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey
The Vice President Cy 02

The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President Cy 03

The Honorable Henry D. Owen
Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
Department of State Cy 04

The Honorable Robert S. McNamara
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The Honorable William P. Bundy
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Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Department of State Cy 09

The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance
Deputy Secretary of Defense Cy 10

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